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We argue that segmented labor markets with flexibility at the margin (e.g., just affecting 
fixed-term employees) may achieve similar volatility than fully deregulated labor 
markets. Flexibility at the margin produces a gap in separation costs among matched 
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device. Moreover, in the presence of limitations in the duration and number of renewals 
of fixed-term contracts, firms respond by fostering labor turnover which further raises 
the volatility of the labor market. We present a matching model with temporary and 
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regulated labor markets with flexibility at the margin vis-à-vis the fully deregulated 
ones. 
 
 
JEL Classification: J23, J41, J63. 
Keywords: flexibility at the margin, volatility, separation costs, matching model. 
 
                                                           
∗ Hector Sala is grateful to the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science for financial support through 
grant SEJ2006-14849/ECON. 
† Departament d’Economia Aplicada, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 08193 Bellaterra, Spain; tel.: 
+ 34 93 5812779; email: hector.sala@uab.es. Correspondence address. 
‡ Departament d’Economia Aplicada, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Edifici B, 08193 Bellaterra, 
Spain; tel: + 34 93 5811680;. e-mail: joseignacio.silva@uab.es. 
§ Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Calle Madrid 126, 28903 Getafe, 
Spain;tel: + 34 91 6249791; e-mail: matoledo@eco.uc3m.es 
1 Introduction
Azariadis and Pissarides (2007) have recently argued that unemployment volatility is magni-
fied by international capital mobility. Our claim is that it is also increased by the legislative
setup. Capital mobility and market (de)regulation are two sides of the same coin, the coin
of a globalization process entailing endless needs of flexibility. This flexibility, however, is
not uniform neither across nor within markets.
This paper argues that flexibility at the margin is a sufficient device to achieve the quick
adjustments and large volatilities that characterize flexible labor markets such as the Anglo-
Saxon ones. This is an important matter because it helps to explain why some regulated
labor markets, such as the Spanish one, display similar volatility than the Anglo-Saxon ones.
Specifically, we argue that the gap in the separation costs between temporary/fixed-term
employees and permanent/regular employees provides a crucial amplification mechanism of
labor market volatility. This gap helps generate a large share of temporary contracts which
are used by firms as the main workforce adjustment device. Hence the term flexibility at
the margin (see Malo and Toharia, 2000). Moreover, in the presence of limitations in the
duration and number of renewals of fixed-term contracts, firms respond by fostering labor
turnover which further increases the volatility of the labor market.
Table 1 offers crucial information to allow a differentiation of two types of labor market
that characterize many OECD economies. First, the well-known Anglo-Saxon type, which
is characterized by a small degree of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) in regular
contracts, and no limitations on the renewal and duration of temporary contracts -which we
denote by [NL] in Table 1-. As a consequence of the high flexibility in the regular segment
of the market, there is a small use of temporary contracts like in Canada (6.9%), Ireland
(7.4%), UK (6.3%) and US (4.5%).
Second, the flexibility-at-the-margin type, which combines a high degree of employment
protection in the regular segment with a limited flexibility in the use of temporary contracts
-which we denote by [L] in Table 1-. Economies such as Portugal, Sweden and Spain are
among the ones with the highest values of the EPL index (4.3, 2.9 and 2.6, respectively)
and display the highest temporary shares (15.8%, 15.1% and 32.3%).
It is well known that fixed-term employment contracts have been introduced in a number
of European countries as a way to provide flexibility to economies with high employment
protection levels. Nevertheless, the implementation of temporary contracts have typically
included restrictions such as limited renewals or maximum durations.1 For example, the
Spanish 1984 labor market reform crucially broadened the scope of fixed-term contracts
while, at the same time, restricted to 3 the maximum number of successive contracts with
a top accumulated duration of 2 years (OECD, 2004). In Portugal, temporary contracts
1For a comprehensive overview of such restrictions, see OECD (2004).
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can also be renewed 3 times, but with a longer maximum duration of 30 months. These
limitations provide a great source of labor turnover and, thus, of labor market volatility.
For example, unemployment volatilities in Portugal and Sweden are 12.1% and 16.2%, well
above those of US and UK (8.7% and 7.0%). In turn, the unemployment volatility in Spain
(7.8%) falls between these two deregulated countries. In other words, the flexibility at the
margin may be important in the achievement of the quick adjustments and high volatilities
that characterize the Anglo-Saxon labor markets.
Table 1. Legislation, capital mobility and unemployment volatility
in OECD countries
Capital
Legislation mobility Volatility
Restrictions EPL Conversion
on TCs on PCs Share rate FDI/DI s.d. (u)
[A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F ]
Belgium [L] 1.7 6.9 42.7 26.1 8.4
Canada [NL] 1.3 12.3 n.a 6.6 6.6
Denmark [L] 1.5 10.6 45.4 8.6 8.2
Finland [L] 2.3 16.8 38.5 6.8 16.2
France [L] 2.3 12.6 20.8 8.4 5.3
Germany [L] 2.7 11.4 40.6 0.6 10.9
Ireland [NL] 1.6 7.4 47.0 15.8 8.7
Italy [L] 1.8 8.2 41.3 2.0 3.9
Japan [NL] 2.4 11.6 n.a 0.3 5.4
Netherlands [L] 3.1 11.8 49.1 12.6 12.5
Spain [L] 2.6 32.3 23.1 7.7 7.8
Sweden [L] 2.9 15.1 n.a 20.9 16.2
UK [NL] 0.9 6.3 56.1 12.1 7.0
US [NL] 0.2 4.5 n.a 1.5 8.7
Portugal [L] 4.3 15.8 39.0 5.8 12.1
Average [L] countries 2.5 14.2 37.8 10.0 10.2
Average [NL] countries 1.3 8.4 51.6 7.2 7.3
Notes: [A] refers to limited renewals and a maximum duration of temporary contracts
(TCs); [NL] stands for No Limitations, [L] for Limitations; [B] refers to an EPL index
on permanent contracts (PCs) in the late 1990s; [C] to the share of TCs in 1999-2003;
[D] to the conversion rate from TCs to PCs in 1996-1997; [E] to the ratio of Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) inflows to Domestic Investment (DI) in 1992-1997;
[F] to the standard deviation (s.d.) of standardized unemployment in 1990:1 to 2005:4.
Sources: [A] OECD (2004); [B] Azariadis and Pissarides (2007);
[C] OECD (2006); [D] OECD (2002); [E] OECD Main Economic Indicators (2007).
To further check to what extent this is a promising hypothesis, Table 1 also provides
the averages by countries with and without restrictions on temporary contracts. Observe
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that the first group has a substantially higher index of EPL (2.5 versus 1.3) and a higher
share of temporary contracts (14.2% versus 8.4%), while it achieves a larger unemployment
volatility (10.2 versus 7.3). Thus, despite the Anglo-Saxon labor markets have a less strin-
gent legislation, unemployment in segmented/dual labor markets with restrictive EPL and
high firing costs in the regular side is, on average, 40% more volatile.
Table 2. Legislation and capital mobility correlation with unemployment
EPL Conversion
on PCs Share rate FDI/DI
[B] [C] [D] [E]
All countries 0.45 0.23 0.18 0.30
Countries with restrictions on TCs [L] 0.47 0.14 0.37 0.25
Table 2 takes a step forward in this analysis by providing the correlation matrix of
unemployment volatilities in the OECD countries with some legislation items and capital
mobility. The main result here is the positive correlation with EPL on regular contracts,
which amounts to 0.45 and is higher than the 0.30 correlation with international mobility in
capital emphasized by Azariadis and Pissarides (2007). Even though the positive association
of the conversion rate from temporary to permanent jobs, with a coefficient of 0.18, is also
remarkable, the second main result refers to this coefficient in the specific case of countries
where employment protection and temporary contracts renewal limitations coexist. In this
case, the correlation coefficient attains a remarkable 0.37.
These results suggest that the analysis of labor markets with flexibility at the margin
may yield important lessons for economies currently involved in labor market institutional
reforms. This paper is a step in this direction. In particular, this paper contributes to the
understanding of the sources of unemployment volatility by assessing the role played by
(i) the gap between the separation costs of the fixed-term and permanent employees; and
(ii) restrictions in the use of temporary contracts. We claim that these are two important
driving forces behind the volatility achieved by segmented labor markets.
To evaluate the business cycle implications associated with the presence of temporary
employment we extend the equilibrium matching model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)
by introducing the possibility that firms hire workers on a fixed-term basis. We, thus,
differentiate between permanent and temporary employees, where the latter have fixed-
term contracts and virtually zero firing costs. Fixed-term contracts have a limited duration
by definition and many countries have introduced legal restrictions on their use in the form
of a maximum number of renewals. When this maximum is reached, firms are bounded
to convert them into permanent contracts, with higher firing costs, and change the status
of the worker. To avoid this restriction, however, firms have the alternative to finish that
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temporary relationship and hire a new temporary worker. Our theoretical model features
these restrictions. Since many OECD countries show a high degree of employment protection
in regular jobs and limited flexibility in the use of temporary ones (see Table 1) we find this
model particularly suitable to study the incidence of flexibility at the margin on labor market
volatility.
Our formal analysis draws on a widely accepted distinction between entrants (or out-
siders) and insiders (see Lindbeck and Snower, 1989), which is not new either in the match-
ing literature (see for example Wasmer, 1999; Blanchard and Landier, 2002; Kugler et al.,
2002; Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002; Osuna, 2005). However, in contrast with the long-run
perspective generally taken by previous studies, this paper differs in scope and focuses ex-
clusively on business cycle fluctuations. Our paper also differs from Boeri and Garibaldi
(2007), who focus on the transitional dynamics of EPL reforms providing flexibility ‘at the
margin’.
The simulated results provide new insights on the effects of different EPL schemes on the
cyclical behavior of job creation, job destruction and unemployment. More precisely, the
main results stem from considering these effects in a situation with flexibility at the margin
in which, we show, the gaps in separation costs between temporary and permanent jobs
and the restricted use of fixed-term contracts increase the labor market volatility. To avoid
transitions to a permanent status which entails future costs in case of adjustments, firms’
workforce adjustments take place more intensively and with higher frequency in temporary
jobs. In particular, rather than converting fixed-term contracts into permanent, firms will
tend to fire ‘old’ temporary workers and hire new ones not yet affected by the legal conver-
sion restriction. Thus, a situation of flexibility at the margin with restrictions generates a
large volatility in the job creation, job destruction and unemployment rates in response to
productivity shocks.
In contrast, when flexibility at the margin is suppressed, most of the volatility in our
model vanishes and gives rise to a scenario similar to that before the explosion of the fixed-
term contracts in many OECD countries. This situation corresponds to the one in the
aftermath of the labor market reforms that took place since the middle of the 1980s in
several of these economies. In short, this paper provides an evaluation of some of the pros
and cons of this type of reforms and gives some policy insights for those countries currently
seeking to foster the flexibility of their labor markets.
A final important result is the almost perfect negative correlation we find between job
reallocation and the business cycle both in fully deregulated and flexibility-at-the-margin
labor market types. This result clarifies a similar empirical finding for Spain in Messina
and Valanti (2007) and helps to explain why the job turnover rate of some regulated labor
markets displays a countercyclical behavior in contrast to the acyclical or even procyclical
movements suggested by some studies (Garibaldi, 1998).
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The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model, which
is calibrated in Section 3 and simulated in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
The economy is integrated by a continuum of risk-neutral, infinitely-lived workers and firms,
which discount future payoffs at a common rate β. We further assume that capital markets
are perfect.
Workers can either be employed or unemployed. Those who are employed can be so
either on a temporary basis (T ), or on a permanent one (P ). When finding a job, unem-
ployed workers become temporary and only from there may be upgraded to permanent with
probability ι. The productivity of the match is a function of aggregate productivity At, and
a term zt idiosyncratic to the match. There is a firm-specific productivity term independent
and identically distributed across firms and time, with a cumulative distribution function
G(z) and support [0, z¯].
There is a time-consuming and costly process of matching workers and job vacancies,
captured by a constant-returns-to-scale matching function m(ut, vt), where ut denotes the
unemployment rate and vt is the vacancy rate. Unemployed workers meet jobs with proba-
bility f(θt) whereas vacancies meet workers with probability q(θt). From the properties of
the matching function, these probabilities only depend on the vacancy-unemployment ratio
θt, where the higher the number of vacancies with respect to the number of unemployed
workers, the easier to find a job and the more difficult to fill up vacancies.
Firms have a constant-returns-to-scale production technology with labor as an only in-
put. A posted job can either be filled or vacant. The firm has to open a job vacancy
entailing cost c per period before a position can be filled. Each productive match yields an
instantaneous profit equal to the difference between labor productivity and the wage, which
is Atzt − wTt (zt) for a temporary position and Atzt − wPt (zt) for a permanent one.
When a match with a temporary job is terminated, the firm pays a firing tax γT , which is
assumed to be fully wasted and lower or equal than the firing tax for a permanent position,
γP . Due to legal restrictions, after renewing a number of times a fixed-term contract, firms
are bounded to convert it into permanent. We abstract from the actual restrictions on the
duration of temporary jobs and the number of renewals and, for simplicity, represent them
by an exogenous conversion probability ι. For instance, the tighter those restrictions are
(i.e., shorter permitted maximum duration and/or fewer possible renewals), the higher ι
is. To avoid these restrictions, however, firms have the alternative to finish that temporary
relationship and hire a new worker. If a match is broken, either from a temporary or a
permanent status, the firm opens a new vacancy.
Accordingly, the value of vacancies (Vt) and filled positions, JTt (zt) and J
P
t (zt), are
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represented by the following Bellman equations:
Vt = −c+ βEt
"
q(θt)
Z ∞
?zIt+1
JTt+1(z)dG(z) + (1− q(θt)(1−G(ezIt+1))Vt+1
#
, (1)
JTt (zt) = Atzt − wTt (zt) + βEt
"
ι
ÃZ ∞
?zCt+1
JPt+1(z)dG(z) +G(ezCt+1) ¡Vt+1 − γT¢
!
+ (1− ι)
ÃZ ∞
?zTt+1
JTt+1(z)dG(z) +G(ezTt+1) ¡Vt+1 − γT¢
!#
, (2)
JPt (zt) = Atzt − wPt (zt) + βEt
"Z ∞
?zPt+1
JPt+1(z)dG(z) +G(ezPt+1) ¡Vt+1 − γP¢
#
, (3)
where ezj, j = I, T, C, P , are productivity thresholds defined such that nonprofitable matches
(i.e., with negative surplus) are severed.2 Thus, the conditions defining these thresholds for
temporary and permanent job destruction (also called reservation productivities) are:
JTt (ezIt )− Vt = 0, (4)
JTt (ezTt )− Vt + γT = 0, (5)
JPt (ezCt )− Vt + γT = 0, (6)
JPt (ezPt )− Vt + γP = 0. (7)
Condition (4) refers to those unemployed workers who have met a vacant job. Note that
in this case the firm does not have to pay γT in the absence of agreement. Expressions
(5) and (7) define the reservation productivity for current temporary and permanent work-
ers, respectively, whereas (6) refers to those temporary workers on the verge of becoming
permanent. That is, those who were drawn with probability ι. Recall that firms have the
option to avoid temporary-to-permanent conversion by laying off workers before they must
be offered a permanent contract due to legal restrictions. Hence, we need to consider the
case where a firm does not want to offer a permanent contract to a temporary worker that
has been randomly chosen to become permanent. Notice that in this case the firm is only
liable to γT if it chooses to break up the match.
Let sIt = G(ezIt ) and sCt = G(ezCt ). It follows that the temporary and permanent matches
separate with probabilities sTt = (1−ι)G(ezTt )+ιsCt and sPt = G(ezPt ), respectively. Moreover,
job creation takes place with probability q(θt)(1− sIt ) when a firm and a worker meet and
agree on an employment contract. Similarly, unemployed workers find a job with probability
f(θt)(1− sIt ).
At the workers’ side the values of the different statuses - unemployed, Ut; temporary
2Since the value of a match is increasing in zt, we can prove that there exists a threshold ezt ∈ [0, z¯] below
which matches are no longer profitable.
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employee,W Tt (zt); and permanent employee,W
P
t (zt) - are given by the following expressions:
Ut = b+ βEt
"
f(θt)
Z ∞
?zIt+1
W Tt+1(z)dG(z) + (1− f(θt)(1−G(ezIt+1))Ut+1
#
, (8)
W Tt (zt) = w
T
t (zt) + βEt
"
ι
ÃZ ∞
?zCt+1
WPt+1(z)dG(z) +G(ezCt+1)Ut+1
!
+ (1− ι)
ÃZ ∞
?zTt+1
W Tt+1(z)dG(z) +G(ezTt+1)Ut+1
!#
, (9)
WPt (zt) = w
P
t (zt) + βEt
"Z ∞
?zPt+1
WPt+1(z)dG(z) +G(ezPt+1)Ut+1
#
. (10)
According to these equations, any unemployed worker gets a constant current value
b from leisure and finds job with probability f(θt). This worker becomes employed in a
temporary job if a match takes place, and remains unemployed if not. Employed workers
earn an endogenous wage wTt (zt) if temporary and w
P
t (zt) if permanent. If a match is broken
either from a temporary or a permanent status, the worker becomes unemployed.
We also assume that there is free entry for firms. Hence firms open vacancies until the
expected value of doing so becomes zero. Therefore, in equilibrium:
Vt = 0. (11)
Furthermore, because neither workers nor employers can instantaneously find an alter-
native match partner in the labor market, and because hiring and firing decisions are costly,
a match surplus exists. To divide this surplus we assume wages to be the result of bilateral
Nash bargaining between workers and firms. They are revised every period upon the occur-
rence of new shocks, and the Nash solution is the wage that maximizes the weighted product
of the workers’ and the firms’ net return from the job match. The first-order conditions for
the temporary and permanent employees yield the following two equations:
(1− η)(W Tt (zt)− Ut) = η(JTt (zt)− Vt + γT ), (12)
(1− η)(WPt (zt)− Ut) = η(JPt (zt)− Vt + γP ), (13)
where η ∈ (0, 1) denotes the workers’ bargaining power relative to firms. Note that the Nash
conditions present terms depending on γT and γP . Because separation costs are operational
they are explicitly considered in the wage negotiation. This implies that the firms’ threat
point when negotiating with a worker is no longer the value of a vacancy Vt but (Vt − γT )
or (Vt − γP ) depending on the type of worker.
To fully characterize the dynamics of the model economy, we need to define the law of
motion for the unemployment rate ut, and the mass of temporary and permanent workers,
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nTt and n
P
t , respectively. These evolve according to the following difference equations:
ut = ut−1 + sTt n
T
t−1 + s
P
t n
P
t−1 − f(θt−1)(1− sIt )ut−1, (14)
nTt = n
T
t−1 + f(θt−1)(1− sIt )ut−1 − sTt nTt−1 − ι(1− sCt )nTt−1, (15)
nPt = n
P
t−1 + ι(1− sCt )nTt−1 − sPt nPt−1. (16)
Moreover, we define the job creation rate (jct) as new matches scaled by employment,
jct =
m(ut−1, vt−1)(1− sIt )
(1− ut)
, (17)
whereas the job destruction rate (jdt) is equal to the average separation rate,
jdt = st =
sTt n
T
t−1 + s
P
t n
P
t−1
(1− ut)
. (18)
3 Calibration
We calibrate the model at quarterly frequency in order to match some steady-state moments
for the US economy. As in den Haan et al. (2000), we set the job finding probability f(θ∗)(1−
s∗) to 0.45, the job filling probability q(θ∗)(1 − s∗) to 0.71, and the job separation rate s∗
to 0.10 (symbol ∗ denotes steady-state level). Substituting these values in equation (14),
with u˙ = 0, we obtain an average unemployment rate of 0.182.3 Similarly, the idiosyncratic
productivity shocks are i.i.d. log-normally distributed with mean µ = 0 and standard
deviation σ = 0.2.
The steady-state aggregate labor productivity A∗ is normalized to one. The logarithm of
this variable follows an AR(1) process such that logAt = ρ logAt−1 + t. The values of the
autoregressive parameter and the standard deviation of the white noise process, ρ = 0.95
and σA = 0.0028, have been calibrated to match the cyclical volatility of the US labor
productivity between 1970 and 2004.4
The discount parameter β, and the worker bargaining parameter η are set to 0.99 and
0.50, respectively. As in den Haan et al. (2000), we assume the matching function to be
m(ut, vt) =
utvt
(uφt + v
φ
t )
1/φ
.
Given the values of the job finding and filling probabilities and the properties of the
3This unemployment rate is reasonable if we include those individuals registered as inactive that are
actively searching for jobs. On this issue see, for example, Blanchard and Diamond (1989).
4As in Shimer (2005), the average labor productivity is the seasonally adjusted real average output
per person in the non-farm business sector, constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) from the
National Income and Product Accounts and the Current Employment Statistics. It is reported in logs as
deviations from an HP trend with smoothing parameter 1600.
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matching function, the steady-state ratio of vacancies to unemployment θ∗ = f(θ
∗)(1−s∗)
q(θ∗)(1−s∗) is
0.634, and the matching parameter φ is 1.637. Finally, the vacancy costs c and the value
of being unemployed b are set to 0.099 and 0.963, which ensures that in the steady state
jc = jd = 0.10.
Table 3. Calibrated parameters for the baseline economy
Parameters Value Source
Ave. aggregate labor productivity A∗ 1 Normalised
Discount rate β 0.99 [A]
Mean of z µ 0 [A]
Standard deviation of z σ 0.02 [A]
Persistence parameter of A ρ 0.95 [B]
Standard deviation of A σA 0.012 [B]
Discount rate β 0.99 [A]
Workers’ bargaining power η 0.50 [A]
Parameter of the matching function φ 1.637 [C]
Hiring costs c 0.099 [C]
Firing costs for temporary contracts γT 0 [A]
Firing costs for permanent contracts γP 0 [A]
Employment conversion rate ι 0 [A]
Leisure parameter b 0.963 [C]
Notes: [A] Other studies, data or own assumptions as explained in main text.
[B] Set to match the cyclical behavior of labor productivity.
[C] Obtained from theoretical model.
For the remaining parameters associated to restrictions in the labor market, γP , γT , and
ι, we consider several cases. Our baseline parameterization describes the US labor market,
where there are hardly any legal restrictions as the ones studied in this paper. Thus, we
set γP = γT = 0. This implies the existence of just one type of job since temporary and
permanent contracts become perfect substitutes. Hence ι becomes irrelevant.5
In next section we simulate different legislative scenarios, which we compare against this
benchmark case. The objective of this exercise is to assess the effects of changes in the
EPL on the labor market volatility. The first of these scenarios represents a situation with
employment protection and no temporary contracts. This case considers that firms provide a
single type of job. It attempts to mimic the situation of several OECD labor markets before
the introduction of the temporary contracts and the development of fixed-term employment
(a paradigmatic case would be Spain before its 1984 labor market reform). In terms of the
model, this has two implications. First, firms are no longer able to make use of fixed-term
contracts. As a consequence, we set γT = γP = γ, ruling out the distinction between
5When γP = γT , ι can take any value in [0,1]. We set it to zero. Similarly, since γP = γT = 0, there is
only one job destruction condition. Thus, st = sTt = s
P
t = s
C
t = s
I
t for all t.
10
temporary and permanent firing costs. The second implication is that the conversion rate
from temporary to permanent contracts becomes irrelevant.
Another scenario presents a situation with employment protection and temporary con-
tracts, which may be subject to restrictions in terms of duration and renewal limitations.
This mimics the situation of most OECD countries in the aftermath of the partial labor
market reforms implemented to introduce flexibility at the margin (again, the paradigmatic
case is Spain after the 1984 labor market reform). Within this scenario, we distinguish
between two cases:
1. We set γT = 0 and consider different values for γP > 0. Moreover, we fix ι = 0.10.
This value is close to the average quarterly conversion rate observed in the OECD
countries. In this context, we evaluate the effects of changes in the permanent-worker
firing cost on the volatility of labor market outcomes.
2. We set γT = 0 and γP = 0.15, so that there is a gap of 15% in firing costs. As
opposed to the previous case, this exercise keeps the gap in separation costs constant.
However, here we consider a number of values for the conversion probability ι from 0
to 1. Thus, for a given gap in separation costs, we evaluate the response of the labor
market to different degrees of restrictions on the duration and renewal of temporary
contracts.
4 Simulation results
For each simulation we create 1000 sample paths of 1140 quarters, throw away the first
1000 and keep the 140 quarters corresponding to 1970-2005; detrend the generated data
using the HP filter with the smoothing parameter equal to 1600; and calculate the standard
deviations of the relevant variables.
As we mentioned in the previous Section, we depart from the benchmark calibrated case,
with no employment protection, and consider different analytical scenarios of labor market
regulations. These scenarios stem from the values assigned to the legislative parameters: the
firing tax parameters, γP and γT , and ι, which captures the existence of renewal restrictions
in temporary contracts. When modifying these key parameters, we hold all the other ones
constant and compute the new equilibrium values of the endogenous variables in the steady
state. We then solve and simulate the model around the new steady state, and compute the
second moments of the relevant variables.
4.1 Employment protection and unemployment volatility
These exercises provide new insights on the effects of different EPL schemes, in particular
of a situation with flexibility-at-the-margin, on the cyclical behavior of job creation, job de-
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struction and unemployment. Table 4 summaries the results from the conducted simulations
by distinguishing three analytical panels.
The first noteworthy result is the rising volatility of the JC rate in response to both
higher firing costs and a larger conversion rate from temporary to permanent contracts.
This is shown in the first column of Table 4. In the absence of temporary contracts (panel
1), when the firing tax is increased from 0% to 15%, the volatility of the JC rate rises around
39% (from 3.76 to 5.23). With flexibility at the margin and the possibility of fixed-term
contracts (panel 2), this volatility is increased by almost 30% (from 3.76 to 4.90). This
scenario, however, assumes a low conversion rate of 10%. When this rate is larger, for
example 50%, then this volatility increases by 56% and reaches 5.86 (panel 3). The high
sensitivity to ι, however, decreases as ι rises further.
Table 4. Simulated volatility under different
scenarios of employment protection
σ(JC) σ(JD) σ(u)
Panel 1: γT = γP = γ, ι = 0
γ = 0.00 (Baseline case) 3.76 4.58 5.40
γ = 0.025 3.91 4.18 5.61
γ = 0.05 4.19 3.72 5.66
γ = 0.10 4.79 2.75 5.34
γ = 0.15 5.23 1.71 4.63
Panel 2: γT = 0.00, ι = 0.10
γP = 0.025 3.98 4.77 5.67
γP = 0.05 4.21 4.96 5.96
γP = 0.10 4.61 5.29 6.57
γP = 0.15 4.90 5.56 7.12
Panel 3: γT = 0.00, γP = 0.15
ι = 0.05 4.22 4.95 6.11
ι = 0.10 4.90 5.56 7.12
ι = 0.50 5.86 5.96 8.18
ι = 1.00 5.80 5.75 8.15
The main intuition under these results is along the lines of Mortensen and Nagypal
(2007) and Silva and Toledo (2007). According to the former, the presence of firing costs
and other fixed labor turnover costs makes firms’ net payoffs (that is, once subtracted these
costs) more responsive to variations in the level of aggregate labor productivity. Silva and
Toledo (2007), in turn, argue that firing costs reduce the firms’ value of the match thereby
generating discontinuous and abrupt adjustments on the job creation margin. These two
works develop matching models similar to the one presented above, but with an important
difference. They consider constant separation rates so that the labor market’s behavior is
entirely driven by the job creation rate.
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Firing costs reduce the value of the newly filled positions which becomes more sensitive
to labor productivity shocks. In response to the wider variation in the value of new jobs
there is a larger fluctuation in the number of vacancies that increases the volatility of the
JC rate. The fact that this rate is relatively more volatile with a larger conversion rate
implies that, the more restricted the duration of a temporary contract, the more sensitive is
the job creation process to productivity shocks. In other words, a more stringent legislation
on temporary jobs, make firms perceive good times as even better times so that they are
more prone to open vacancies relative to the case of a labor market without these type of
contracts.
In contrast to the response of the JC rate, the cyclical behavior of the job destruction
rate (JD) differs across scenarios (column 2 in Table 4). With employment protection and no
temporary contracts (panel 1), a rise in firing costs from 0% to 15% reduces the volatility of
the JD rate by more than 3.5 times (from 4.58 to 1.71). The opposite occurs when firms are
allowed to use fixed-term contracts: with flexibility at the margin (panel 2), it increases by
21% (from 4.58 to 5.56). Further, when the conversion rate from temporary to permanent
workers moves from 10% to 50%, the JD volatility has an additional increase of 7% (panel
3). As before, additional rises in ι generate smaller marginal responses in the JD volatility.
The first response is a well known result in the literature. The higher the firing costs,
the more expensive becomes shedding workers. In this event firms tend to reduce their
job destruction rate and make it less sensitive to shocks. New empirical evidence has been
recently provided by Messina and Valanti (2007) for a set of 14 European countries and firm
level data. They find that firms facing tight firing restrictions smooth job destruction over
the business cycle.
This response, however, changes dramatically when firms are allowed to have flexibility
at the margin. To avoid incurring in firing costs, they will make use of fixed-term contracts
which will be more intensive the higher the separation tax on permanent workers. Moreover,
in case of having to face restrictions in terms of the duration and number of renewals of
fixed-term contracts, firms will find it optimal to further increase their labor turnover as
a way to avoid transitions to a permanent status, which entails future costs in case of
adjustments. In particular, before converting fixed-term contracts, they will hire another
temporary worker and start the process again. In short, in response to productivity shocks,
a situation of flexibility at the margin with restrictions generates a large volatility in the JD
rate. Of course, this happens just up to a certain threshold (placed at a conversion rate of
50% in our analysis), which is plausible given that firms need a core set of stable workers.6
Finally, as a summary measure of the responses via JC and JD we assess the changes
in the unemployment rate volatility (third column in Table 4). One of the new insights of
6Dolado, García-Serrano and Jimeno (2002), for example, refer to a steady-state level of the temporary
share in Spain, which they place at a third of the dependent employment. The rest, thus, is the core set of
stable workers needed by firms.
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our analysis is that, in the absence of flexibility at the margin (panel 1), unemployment
fluctuations display a nonlinear relationship with respect to changes in the firing tax rates.
This is the outcome of the movements, in opposite directions, of the standard deviations
of the JC and JD rates. For low firing tax rates (up to 5%), the JC volatility magnifying
effects surpass the JD compressing effects and the volatility of unemployment increases by
6% (from 5.40 to 5.66). This positive effect is well known from the works by Mortensen and
Nagypal (2007) and Silva and Toledo (2007). However, after some threshold in the gap of
firing costs, which in our case is 5%, higher firing taxes prompt a change in the relationship
between unemployment volatility and employment protection. In particular, when γ is
beyond 5% the JD volatility reduction exceeds the increase in the standard deviation of the
JC rate and generates a decline in unemployment volatility. Notice that the net effect for
γ = 10% is virtually neutral (from 5.40 to 5.34).
When the labor market is characterized by employment protection on the permanent
workers’ side, but with the possibility of hiring on a fixed-term basis (panel 2), the unem-
ployment rate volatility displays an unanimous positive association with the gap in the firing
costs of these two type of workers. In particular, when the firing tax rate (and thus the gap)
is shifted from 0% to 15%, this volatility increases by 32% (from 5.40 to 7.12). Moreover,
when the effects of the restrictions that bind the use of the temporary contracts are more
stringent, it is further enhanced by 15% (from the former 7.12 when ι = 0.10, to 8.18 with
ι = 0.50). Again, this is true up to some threshold value, after which higher values of the
conversion rate ι have very low incidence on firms’ hiring decisions.
4.2 Employment protection and job reallocation
Let us now get back to Messina and Valanti’s (2007) study on the impact of firing restrictions
on job flow dynamics. They provide evidence that firms with tight firing restrictions smooth
job destruction over the business cycle so that job turnover becomes less countercyclical.
This is a result in line with previous studies that suggests an acyclical behavior of the labor
flows in Continental Europe in contrast with their countercyclical pattern in the Anglo-
Saxon countries (see Garibaldi, 1998).
However, Messina and Valanti also find some empirical evidence suggesting that the
presence of temporary contracts may counter-balance the positive effect of the EPL on
the cyclical behavior of job reallocation (JR), which is the sum of job creation and job
destruction (that is, JR = JC + JD). More specifically, they find a significant negative
correlation between job reallocation and the business cycle in Spain, which is one of the
countries with the most stringent EPL (see Table 1 in Messina and Valanti, 2007). In view
of this counter-balancing effect via temporary contracts, they further estimate the incidence
of fixed-term contracts on the cyclical behavior of JR with no success. According to their
reasoning, a possible reason behind the absence of a significant relationship between these
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variables is that temporary contracts only affect the cyclicality of job flows through its
complementarity with employment protection.
This possibility is the one we explore next. In particular, we ask our model to what
extent the coexistence of EPL in permanent contracts with flexibility at the margin has a
relevant incidence on JR. We measure this incidence with the correlation between the JR
and the business cycle.
The answer is provided in Table 5 where, again, we distinguish three stylized cases: (i) a
pure deregulated market, where γP = γT = ι = 0; (ii) a regulated market with no temporary
contracts, where γP = γT = 0.15 and ι = 0; and (iii) a regulated market with restricted
flexibility at the margin, where γT = 0, γP = 0.15 and ι = 0.1.
It is interesting to observe that in the first case, which we associate with the ‘Anglo-
Saxon type’ labor market, there is an almost perfect negative correlation between JR and the
business cycle (-0.95). Further, it is also noteworthy the quasi pro-cyclical correlation (0.27)
obtained in a regulated market with no flexibility at the margin, which is traditionally
associated with some Continental European labor markets, as in Garibaldi (1998). The
results on these two cases would generally be consistent also with the evidence provided by
Messina and Valanti (2007). The value added of this exercise, however, lies in the third
case, where the use of fixed-term contracts is restricted. We associate this case with the
flexibility-at-the-margin type of labor market defined in the introduction.
Table 5. Simulated correlation between JR and the business cycle
Deregulated market Regulated market Regulated market with
with no temporality restrictions in temporality
γT = γP = 0.00 γT = γP = 0.15 γT = 0.00, γP = 0.15
ι = 0 ι = 0 ι = 0.1
corr(yt, JRt) -0.954 0.268 -0.865
Note: Total output is equal to yt = AtzTt n
T
t +Atz
P
t n
P
t − cvt, where zTt and zPt are,
respectively, the average idiosyncratic productivity shocks across temporary and
regular jobs. As before, we detrend the generated data using the HP filter
with the smoothing parameter is set equal to 1600.
As shown in Table 5, the large negative correlation between JR and the business cycle
(-0.87) resembles very much the one of the pure deregulated labor market. Given the
underlying analysis, we interpret this result as evidence that flexibility at the margin is a
sufficient device to achieve the quick adjustments and large volatilities that characterize the
fully flexible labor markets. This finding is, thus, a clear expression of the contribution of
our analysis to this important issue.
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5 Conclusions
This paper argues that segmented labor markets with flexibility at the margin may achieve
similar volatilities than fully deregulated labor markets. This is important because most
OECD countries seem to conform to these two broadly defined type of markets. On the one
hand, the liberalized or Anglo-Saxon type is characterized by low levels of EPL in regular
contracts and no restrictions in the use of temporary employment. On the other hand, what
we call the flexibility-at-the-margin type features stringent EPL and limitations in the use
of temporary contracts. The firms’ response to these different institutional setups is in stark
contrast: in the first case, there is an occasional use of temporary contracts whereas in the
second one firms rely deeply on fixed-term employment. Irrespective of the firms’ labor
management strategies, the outcome in terms of the volatility of the labor market is similar.
We rationalize this outcome by developing a matching model with heterogenous workers.
In the spirit of the insider-outsider theory, we distinguish between regular and fixed-term
employees and focus the analysis on a twofold dimension of segmented labor markets. First,
on the effects that the gap in firing costs among these two type of workers has on the
volatility of the labor market. Second, on the additional effects that arise from restricting
the use of fixed-term contracts in terms of their duration and maximum number of renewals.
The gap in firing costs reduces the value of new filled positions on account of the future
costs that firms will face when some proportion of the new hired fixed-term workers becomes
permanent. This lower value implies a larger sensitivity with respect to shocks, which gen-
erates a larger fluctuation in the amount of vacancies posted. Hence the rise in the volatility
of the job creation process. The intuition behind the second effect is straightforward. To
avoid compulsory transitions to a permanent status, which entail future costs in case of
adjustments, it is optimal for the firms to fire the workers whose contract is about to be
upgraded for legal reasons, at no cost, and start a new relationship far in time from the
binding legal restrictions on the fixed-term contract. This increases the volatility of the job
destruction process and, as a consequence, the unemployment rate becomes more sensitive
to productivity shocks.
We find that the volatility of the job creation rate is positively associated with the three
key aspects of the legislation emphasized by our model: its rise amounts to 39% when firing
costs increases from 0% to 15%, to 30% when non-restricted flexibility at the margin is
allowed, and to 56% when the conversion rate from a temporary to a permanent contract is
fixed at the level of 50%. In contrast, the volatility of the job destruction rate declines by
more than 3.5 times in the first case, but increases 21% in the second and 30% in the third.
These responses yield a new insight in the analysis of the legislative setup incidence on the
volatility of the labor market: the change in the direction of the response in job destruction
generates a non-linearity in the relationship of the unemployment volatility with the gap in
separation costs.
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A final important result is the almost perfect negative correlation we find between job
reallocation and the business cycle both in the Anglo-Saxon and the flexibility-at-the-margin
labor market types. This result clarifies the analogous finding for Spain in Messina and
Valanti (2007), that could not be confirmed for the rest of the countries in the context of
their analysis. Our paper, in fact, provides the rationale for such a finding.
Let us finish by stating that the achievement of similar flexibility/volatility than fully
deregulated markets without fully deregulating the labor market is not synonymous of suc-
cess. The study of the consequences of ‘flexibility at the margin’ by no means implies that
this a desirable feature. There are profound differences in these two types of labor market
whose assessment lied beyond the scope of this paper but that, nevertheless, deserve ut-
most attention. Among them is the gap in productivity between temporary and permanent
workers.7 Any economic strategy relying excessively on fixed-term employment may end up
biased towards low profile industries, low paid jobs and, generally, have a poor productivity
performance. Spain is a paradigmatic case but this is left for future research.
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